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C O N F I D E N T I A L SECTION 01 OF 04 NATO 06338

BELGRADE FOR USDEL CSCE

E. O. 11652: GDS
TAGS: NATO, PFOR, CSCE
SUBJECT: CANADIAN PROPOSAL FOR NATO CONSULTATIONS
ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSCE

REF: (A) STATE 152142, (B) USNATO 5795, (C) BELGRADE 4279,
(D) OTTAWA 5698, (E) USNATO 6192
SUMMARY: AT JUNE 30 PRIVATE PERMREPS MEETING ON CANADIAN
PROPOSAL FOR NATO CONSULTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS AND CSCE,
THERE WAS LITTLE SUPPORT FOR EARLY COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS
ON THIS ISSUE. A NUMBER OF PERMREPS STRESSED THE IMPOR-
TANCE OF POLADS AND ECONADS WORK ON PREPARATIONS FOR THE
MAIN BELGRADE MEETING AND THE ADVISABILITY OF A MEETING OF
HEADS OF ALLIED DELEGATIONS TO BELGRADE WITH THE COUNCIL
SHORTLY BEFORE THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING. HARDY (CANADA)
URGED THE ALLIES TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON THE RESULTS THEY
HOPED TO ACHIEVE AT BELGRADE IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS FIELD AND
SUGGESTED SPECIFIC QUESTIONS ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER IN AD-
DRESSING THIS SUBJECT. SEVERAL PERMREPS EXPRESSED THE VIEW
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THAT IT WAS STILL TOO EARLY TO DRAW UP PRECISE OBJECTIVES
FOR THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING, THAT THERE WOULD BE SOME AD-
VANTAGE IN A DIVERSITY OF ALLIED APPROACHES, AND THAT THE
ALLIES SHOULD CONTINUE EFFORTS TO MAINTAIN NEUTRAL AND NON-
ALIGNED SUPPORT AT BELGRADE. WE ANTICIPATE FURTHER PERM-
REPS DISCUSSION OF THIS ISSUE AT LUNCHEES AND POSSIBLY AT
ANOTHER PRIVATE MEETING, BUT THERE APPEARS TO BE LITTLE

SENTIMENT IN FAVOR OF EARLY FORMAL COUNCIL CONSIDERATION OF CSCE OR THE CANADIAN PROPOSAL. END SUMMARY.

1. READING FROM EXTENSIVE SPEAKING NOTES PROVIDED BY OTTAWA (TRANSMITTED AT THE END OF THIS CABLE), HARDY EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE ALLIES TO DEFINE THEIR OBJECTIVES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE NEXT FALL, POSED A NUMBER OF QUESTIONS DESIGNED TO STIMULATE ALLIED THINKING, REQUESTED ALLIED REACTIONS, BUT DID NOT PRESS FOR A FORMAL COUNCIL MEETING ON THIS SUBJECT.

2. DRAWING ON REF A, THE AMBASSADOR STRESSED THE US DESIRE TO WORK CLOSELY WITH THE ALLIES IN ARRIVING AT COMMON POSITIONS ON ALL ASPECTS OF THE BELGRADE CONFERENCE, AND SAID WE COULD AGREE TO CONSULTATIONS ON HUMAN RIGHTS MATTERS IF ALLIED SENTIMENT FAVORED SUCH A DISCUSSION. HE REVIEWED THE US APPROACH TO THIS ISSUE, PARTICULARLY AS SET FORTH BY SECRETARY VANCE IN HIS JUNE 6 STATEMENT TO THE CSCE COMMISSION, NOTED THE IMPORTANCE WE ATTACH TO SUBSTANTIVE PREPARATIONS FOR BELGRADE UNDERWAY IN POLADS, AND URGED THE ALLIES TO MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY IN COMING WEEKS, PARTICULARLY ON THE PAPERS ON THEMES AND NEW PROPOSALS.

3. SPEAKING WITHOUT INSTRUCTIONS, KILLICK (UK) NOTED THAT THE POSTURE OF INDIVIDUAL ALLIES ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE MAIN MEETING WOULD BE INFLUENCED BY THE PRESSURE OF PUBLIC OPINION AT THAT TIME AND POSSIBLY ALSO BY REACTIONS TO THE ACTIVITIES. CONFIDENTIAL

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TIES OF DISSIDENTS IN EASTERN EUROPE. HE AGREED WITH THE CANADIANS THAT THE ALLIES SHOULD CONSIDER CAREFULLY THE DEGREE OF SOVIET TOLERANCE FOR WESTERN PRESSURE ON HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE, BUT THOUGHT THE ALLIES WOULD HAVE TO TAKE SOME RISKS IN THIS AREA AND MUST NOT SIMPLY LEAVE IT TO THE SOVIETS TO DEFINE THE LIMITS OF THEIR TOLERANCE. KILLICK THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE UNWISE TO ATTEMPT TO SET OUT A LIST OF PRIORITIES IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA COMMON TO ALL ALLIES, SINCE THERE WOULD BE ADVANTAGES IN PRESERVING A DEGREE OF DIVERSITY IN ALLIED APPROACHES.

4. CATALANO (ITALY) SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD REGISTER THEIR STRONG SUPPORT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONNECTION WITH THE REVIEW OF THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE AND ALSO ENCOURAGE BASKET III IMPLEMENTATION, IN A PRUDENT MANNER, COGNISANT OF THE REAL POSSIBILITIES OPEN TO THE ALLIES, BUT WITHOUT PERMITTING THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH AN ARTIFICIAL LOW LEVEL OF TOLERANCE. HE AGREED REGARDING THE IMPORTANCE OF POLADS AND ECONADS WORK AT THIS STAGE, HOPED THE COUNCIL WOULD MEET WITH HEADS OF DELEGATIONS BEFORE THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING, AND THOUGHT THE FRG QUESTIONNAIRE ON THE STATUS OF HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE (REF E) WOULD USEFULLY CONTRIBUTE TO ALLIED

CONSIDERATION OF THIS ISSUE.

5. SVART (DENMARK) STRESSED THE IMPORTANCE OF ALLIED COLLABORATION WITH THE NEUTRALS AND NON-ALIGNED AND THE NEED TO KEEP IN MIND HOW VALUABLE THEIR SUPPORT WAS TO THE ALLIES (AND HOW DAMAGING TO THE SOVIETS) ON CSCE ISSUES.

6. PAULS (FRG) SUGGESTED THE ALLIES AVOID TOO GREAT AN EMPHASIS ON THE PRINCIPLES AT THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING, A SUBJECT ON WHICH DEBATE COULD BECOME HEATED AND EMOTIONAL, AND CENTER THEIR MAIN EFFORTS ON CONCRETE ISSUES RELEVANT

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TO BASKET III. NOTING THE ADVANTAGES OF DIVERSITY OF ALLIED INTERESTS, IN A WELL-ORCHESTRATED OVERALL APPROACH TO BELGRADE, PAULS EMPHASIZED THE NEED TO MAINTAIN A BUSINESS-LIKE ATMOSPHERE SO THAT PUBLIC PRESSURES AND PUBLIC POSITURES DO NOT FORECLOSE THE POSSIBILITY OF SERIOUS DISCUSSIONS WITH THE OTHER SIDE ON CONCRETE ISSUES SUCH AS EMIGRATION AND REUNION OF FAMILIES, WHICH WERE OF GREAT INTEREST TO THE FRG. RATHER THAN CONCENTRATING ON INDIVIDUAL HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS IN EASTERN EUROPE, AN APPROACH THAT MIGHT CALL TOO MUCH PUBLIC ATTENTION TO PARTICULAR INDIVIDUALS WHILE THOUSANDS OF OTHERS WOULD BE LOST FROM VIEW, PAULS SUGGESTED THE ALLIES MIGHT BETTER CONCENTRATE ON THE PROBLEMS OF BROAD ETHNIC AND RELIGIOUS GROUPS IN THE HUMAN RIGHTS AREA. PAULS AGREED WITH THE NEED TO CLARIFY ALLIED OBJECTIVES AND ON THE IMPORTANCE OF RETAINING NEUTRAL AND NON-ALIGNED SUPPORT.

7. BUWALDS (NETHERLANDS CHARGE) BELIEVED IT WAS INCUMBENT ON THE WEST TO EMPHASIZE HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE SINCE HUMAN RIGHTS AND BASKET III PROVISIONS HAD BEEN INCLUDED IN THE FINAL ACT AT WESTERN INSISTENCE. HE AGREED POLADS SHOULD
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MOVE AHEAD EXPEDITIOUSLY, BUT NOTED INEVITABILITY OF SOME DELAY AS ALLIED EXPERTS FOCUS ON BELGRADE. HE DISAGREED WITH US REFERENCE TO ARRIVING AT COMMON POSITIONS ON BELGRAD AND EXPRESSED VIEW THAT A CERTAIN DIVERSITY IN ALLIED APPROACHES WOULD BE BENEFICIAL.

8. NOTING SOME UNCERTAINTY IN THE PRESENT SITUATION AT BELGRADE, VIBE (NORWAY) SUGGESTED THAT ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES MIGHT NEED SOME GUIDANCE ON HOW HARD TO PRESS THE US/UK DRAFT AGENDA.

9. TINE (FRANCE) SAID HE WAS STRUCK BY THE AMBITION OF THE QUESTIONS RAISED BY THE CANADIANS. THE FRENCH APPROACH WAS TO MAINTAIN AN EQUILIBRIUM AMONG ALL THREE BASKETS AT BELGRADE. TINE SAID AN EXAMINATION OF OBJECTIVES FOR THE MAIN MEETING WOULD NOT REALLY BE FRUITFUL UNTIL AFTER CONCLUSION OF THE PREPARATORY MEETING. HE DOUBTED THERE WOULD BE MUCH PROGRESS IN POLADS IN COMING WEEKS SINCE ALLIED EXPERTS WERE PREOCCUPIED WITH DEVELOPMENTS AT BELGRADE. TINE SPECIFICALLY AGREED TO A MEETING OF THE COUNCIL WITH ALLIED DELEGATION HEADS SHORTLY BEFORE THE MAIN BELGRADE MEETING. HE SAID FRANCE WOULD NOT PARTICIPATE IN PREPARATION OF RESPONSES TO THE FRG QUESTIONNAIRE ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN EASTERN EUROPE, AND, IN FACT, OPPOSED THIS INITIATIVE AND BELIEVED IT WOULD BE UNWISE FOR ALLIED REPRESENTATIVES TO GATHER IN THEIR EMBASSIES IN EASTERN EUROPE TO WORK ON THIS PROJECT.

10. AGREEING TO REMARKS REGARDING THE ADVANTAGES OF SOME DIVERSITY IN ALLIED APPROACHES, SCHUURMANS (BELGIUM) SAID THE ALLIES SHOULD NOT CAVE IN TO SOVIET BLACKMAIL BASED ON THE ASSERTION THAT DETENTE WOULD BE COMPROMISED IF THE WEST AFFIRMED ITS OBJECTIVES AT BELGRADE.

11. KIRCA (TURKEY) EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR CAUTION IN DE-
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BATE ON PRINCIPLES AT BELGRADE, AND COMMENTED ON THE NEED FOR DELICACY IN TURKISH PUBLIC COMMENTS ON HUMAN RIGHTS SINCE THE SOVIETS INTERPRET SUCH REMARKS AS AIMED AT TURKISH MINORITIES IN THE USSR.

12. FISCHBACH (LUXEMBOURG) CALLED FOR A STRONG ALLIED LINE ON BASKET III AND THE SEVENTH PRINCIPLE AT BELGRADE AND SUPPORTED COUNCIL CONSULTATIONS FOLLOWING THE PREPARATORY MEETING.

13. BEGIN TEXT OF CANADIAN SPEAKING NOTES:

---AT OUR LUNCHEON ON JUNE 21, I CONVEYED IN GENERAL TERMS THE PREOCCUPATIONS OF THE CANADIAN AUTHORITIES CONCERNING THE HANDLING OF THE QUESTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE.

---AFTER GIVING THE MATTER A GREAT DEAL OF THOUGHT, CANADIAN AUTHORITIES BELIEVE THAT MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE SHOULD SEEK TO DEVELOP A CONSENSUS ON THE REASONABLE RESULTS THAT THE WESTERN SIDE MIGHT HOPE TO ACHIEVE IN THIS AREA AT BELGRADE. WHAT IS THE "END PRODUCT" THAT WE MAY REALISTICALLY ENVISAGE?

---IN DEFINING THIS "END PRODUCT" THE FOLLOWING STEPS WOULD SEEM TO BE REQUIRED:

(A) FIRST, WE WILL HAVE TO MAKE A JUDGMENT ON THE PROSPECTS AND TIME SCALE OF THE OBJECTIVES OF THE FINAL ACT BEING REACHED. IF WE COME TO THE CONCLUSION THAT LITTLE OR NO REAL IMPLEMENTATION CAN BE EXPECTED IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE, THE VALUE OF THE FINAL ACT WAS AN EFFECTIVE INSTRUMENT FOR THE PROMOTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS WILL NEED TO BE REASSESSED. IF, ON THE OTHER HAND, WE CONSIDER THAT THERE IS

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SOME REAL PROSPECT FOR IMPLEMENTATION, THEN THE QUESTION BECOMES ONE OF THE FORM WHICH SUCH IMPLEMENTATION SHOULD TAKE.

(B) SECONDLY, IF WE DO EXPECT TO ACHIEVE SOME USEFUL RESULTS, WE SHOULD STRIVE TO REACH AGREEMENT WITH EASTERN EUROPE ON THE AREAS OF MAIN CONCERN AND INTEREST TO THE WEST WHAT DO WE MOST WANT FROM EASTERN EUROPE IN THESE RESPECTS; IT IS PRIMARILY AN UPGRADING IN HUMAN RIGHTS, IN HUMAN CONTACTS, OR IN THE FREE FLOW OF INFORMATION? AT HELSINKI AND GENEVA, THE WEST SUCCEEDED IN INJECTING A HUMAN DIMENSION INTO THE CSCE; AT BELGRADE WE SHOULD PRESUMABLY SEEK TO GIVE THIS ELEMENT PRACTICAL SUBSTANCE.

(C) THIRDLY, WHAT PRIMARILY DO WE WANT FROM EASTERN EUROPE AT BELGRADE IN THE FIELD OF HUMAN RIGHTS ITSELF?

--(1) IS IT AN AMNESTY FOR POLITICAL PRISONERS?

--(2) IS IT AN OPPORTUNITY FOR DISSIDENTS TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRIES?

--(3) OR AN OPPORTUNITY FOR THEM TO REMAIN TO CARRY OUT
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THEIR ACTIVITIES IN THEIR OWN COUNTRIES WITHOUT HARASSMENT?

--(4) WILL WE BE STRIVING FOR CHANGES IN THE LAWS AND REGULATIONS OF EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES WHICH MAKE IT DIFFICULT FOR DISSIDENTS TO GET FINANCIAL AND OTHER SUPPORT FROM ABROAD?

--(5) WILL WE SEEK TO OBTAIN GUARANTEES THAT DISSIDENTS WILL BE ALLOWED, WITHIN THEIR COUNTRY AND ABROAD, TO EXPRESS AND DISSEMINATE THEIR VIEWS ON POLITICAL AND OTHER SUBJECTS WITHOUT SUFFERING HARDSHIPS AS A CONSEQUENCE?

--(6) WILL WE AIM AT MODIFICATIONS IN LAWS, REGULATIONS OR PRACTICES THAT PREVENT INDIVIDUALS FROM WORSHIPING AS THEY WISH AND EDUCATING THEIR CHILDREN, EITHER PRIVATELY OR TOGETHER WITH OTHERS, IN THEIR RELIGIOUS FAITH?

--(7) WILL WE TRY TO OBTAIN GUARANTEES THAT INDIVIDUALS WILL BE ABLE TO LEAVE THEIR COUNTRY WHENEVER THEY WANT, WHETHER FOR PRIVATE OR PROFESSIONAL REASONS OR FOR EMIGRATION?

--(8) WILL WE PROMOTE CHANGES IN LAWS AND REGULATIONS THAT AT PRESENT PREVENT INFORMATION AND IDEAS FROM ENTERING COUNTRIES AND CIRCULATING FREELY (SUBJECT ONLY TO CERTAIN CONDITIONS RELATIONS TO TREASON, MORALITY, VIOLENCE, ETC.)?

--(9) DO WE INTEND TO ASK FOR A CASE-BY-CASE DISCUSSION
OF HUMAN RIGHTS PROBLEMS?

---SUCH QUESTIONS AS THESE ARE NOT INTENDED TO REFLECT
CANADIAN CHOICES. THEY MERELY REPRESENT A CATALOGUE OF SOME
OF THE CLAIMS THAT THE CANADIAN GOVERNMENT IS BEING PRESSED
TO MAKE AT BELGRADE. BUT PERHAPS THIS IS TOO INDIGESTIBLE.

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---CANADIAN SPOKESMAN, IN PARTICULAR OUR SECRETARY OF STATE
FOR EXTERNAL AFFAIRS AT THE MEETING OF THE COUNCIL IN LONDON
HAVE PUT FORWARD BEFORE NATO THE MORE MODEST OBJECTIVE WHICH
WOULD CONSIST OF ACKNOWLEDGING AT BELGRADE THE RIGHT OF IN-
DIVIDUALS TO HAVE A DIALOGUE WITH THEIR GOVERNMENTS AND TO
HOLD THEIR GOVERNMENTS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE INTERNATIONAL
COMMITMENTS THAT THEY HAVE UNDERTAKEN. BUT PERHAPS WE
SHOULD AIM HIGHER.

---NOT ONLY SHOULD WESTERN COUNTRIES ESTABLISH WHAT THEY
WANT TO PRESS FOR AT BELGRADE, BUT THEY SHOULD ALSO IDEN-
TIFY THE ASPECTS OF THE FINAL ACT TO WHICH THEY MIGHT RE-
SPOND TO MEET SIMILAR DEMANDS ON THE PART OF EASTERN EUROPE.

(D) FINALLY, WE WOULD PRESUMABLY WISH TO SEE WHATEVER AGREE-
MENT IS FINALLY REACHED WITH EASTERN EUROPE AT BELGRADE
RECORDED IN SOME KIND OF CONFERENCE DOCUMENT WHICH, AMONGST
OTHER PURPOSES, WOULD SATISFY WESTERN PUBLIC OPINION THAT
SOMETHING USEFUL HAD BEEN ACHIEVED.

---ONCE WE HAVE COME TO A COMMON UNDERSTANDING ON THE OBJEC-
TIVES THAT WE WANT TO PURSUE, IT SHOULD BE RELATIVELY EASY
TO AGREE ON PROCEDURES AND TACTICS, IN PARTICULAR HOW WE
MIGHT BEST RAISE THE SUBJECT OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE NEX
FALL, WHETHER IN GENERAL OR SPECIFIC, IN HARD OR MODERATE
TERMS.

---OUR FIRST OCCASION TO DO SO WILL BE DURING THE OPENING
PLENARY STATEMENT WHICH EACH PARTICIPANT WILL MAKE. OUR
DECLARATIONS ON THAT OCCASION WILL COMMIT OUR DELEGATIONS
TO THE GENERAL COURSE OF ACTION WHICH WE WILL INTEND TO
FOLLOW. THEY WILL NEED TO BE APPROVED AT THE HIGHEST LEVEL
OF GOVERNMENT, AS THEY WILL SET THE STANDARDS BY WHICH OUR
PUBLIC OPINION WILL SUBSEQUENTLY JUDGE OUR PERFORMANCE.

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CLEARLY EVEN IF OPENING STATEMENTS BY WESTERN DELEGATIONS
NEED NOT BE FORMALLY HARMONIZED, THEY SHOULD AVOID MAJOR
DIFFERENCES OF APPROACH. THEY SHOULD BE BASED ON SOME
SHARED PERCEPTION OF THE "END PRODUCT" THAT IS DESIRED.

---IN DEVISING WAYS OF REACHING THEIR HUMAN RIGHTS OBJEC-
TIVES, MEMBERS OF THE ALLIANCE WILL WISH TO BEAR IN MIND
ANOTHER IMPORTANT OBJECTIVE--THAT OF AVOIDING AS FAR AS
POSSIBLE THAT BELGRADE SHOULD BECOME A NEGATIVE AND COUNTER
PRODUCTIVE FACTOR IN THE LARGER DETENTE PROCESS.

---WE MUST ASK OURSELVES, THEREFORE, HOW FAR WE WOULD BE
PREPARED TO RISK CONFRONTATION? WOULD WE ACCEPT TO SEE THE
CONFERENCE BREAK DOWN COMPLETELY? HOW MUCH DAMAGE WOULD
SUCH A BREAKDOWN DO TO DETENTE--A LITTLE OR A LOT?

---WE MUST ALSO BEWARE OF THE ILLUSION THAT THE CHOICE AT
BELGRADE MAY BE BETWEEN PUBLIC AND PRIVATE DIPLOMACY. MUCH
MAY USEFULLY BE SAID PRIVATELY BUT IN A CONFERENCE OF THIS
KIND EVERYTHING WILL EVENTUALLY BECOME PUBLIC.

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---IN SUMMARY, THE FUNDAMENTAL PROBLEM BEFORE US REGARDING
HUMAN RIGHTS AT BELGRADE CONCERNS THE OBJECTIVES THAT WE
SHOULD PURSUE AND THE METHODS OF ACHIEVING THEM. IT MAY
BE TOO EARLY NOW TO DECIDE ON THE PRECISE WAY OF HANDLING
THE ISSUE OF HUMAN RIGHTS AT THE MAIN CONFERENCE, BUT IT
IS NOT TOO EARLY TO DISCUSS THE DESIRED OUTCOME AND THE AL-
TERNATIVE METHODS OF PURSUING IT.

---FINALLY, WE WILL HAVE TO GIVE SOME THOUGHT ALSO TO THE
RELATIONSHIP THAT MAY BE ESTABLISHED, BY OURSELVES NO LESS
THAN BY EASTERN EUROPEAN COUNTRIES, BETWEEN PRINCIPLE VII
REGARDING HUMAN RIGHTS, PRINCIPLE VI REGARDING NON-INTER-
FERENCE IN THE INTERNAL AFFAIRS OF STATES, AND PRINCIPLE
VIII REGARDING EQUAL RIGHTS AND SELF-DETERMINATION OF
PEOPLES.

---FOR ALL THESE REASONS, WE WOULD WELCOME THE VIEWS OF
OUR ALLIES ON THE VARIOUS ASPECTS OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS
ISSUE ON WHICH I HAVE TOUCHED. END TEXT. BENNETT

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